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OPTIMAL STABLE POLICIES FOR UNSTABLE INSTRUMENTS
nv CFIRIsTOPHIR A.Sisis
R. S. Holbrook (197_I) showed that attempts to tflifliini:t' detiations qi tin emhigenous tariahh' from a
target mar produce explosite time pat hsfor the instrument rarhthles. Cagan and Schwartz(1923) show'd
that for a situation where GNP is endagenous and a monetary aggregate the insfruppient. some estimated
lag distrthurions in the literature imply (lie presence' of instrunient instahthty. A formal solution It)(lit'
problem u_f instrument instability is complete wlu'n one' simply notes that jf one cares about the explosire
time path of the instrument. tiainstriimt'nr ought to appear in the objectirefunct ion'',ninnni:ing dei'iat ions
u_f the endogenous t'ariablefrorn a targeti.s nut the' appropriate ohjeciu'e. llowcuer, if we consider optimal
policy with an infinite time horizon and with in5trilnte'nr :'ariance entered 1,1 i/ic ohje'ctii'e functionwith
slnall weight, the limit of such policies as weight on the instrument goes to zero is no! the smm' asthe optimal
policy when the' weight is exact/v zero. Furthermore, optimal policy with zero weight o,i instrument iariatltifl
does not depend on the' time' horizon. This sit cation oJdiscontinuitv hits practical inipliesitiotis for economic'
applications of optimal control, as it implies that correctly computed optimal policies usingreahstica Hr
smhl weights on instrument t'ariat ion and long but finite time horizons may hc' unstable'and quite' dif/e're'nt
from the stable in/i nit e-luiriziin solution.
Optimal policy aimed at minimizing deviations of anendogenous variable from
some target may produce anexplosive time path for the instrument variable, as
Holbrook (1972) has pointed out. Recently Caganand Schwartz (1973) have
shown that in a simple system with a monetary aggregate asinstrument and current-
dollar GNP as endogenous, this situation of"instrument instability" arises if
some of the estimated lagdistributions from income on money regressionsin the
econometric literature are taken as describing theinfluence of instrument on the
dependent variable, They have argued thattherefore discretionary monetary
policy ought to be replaced by a simplepolicy rule that would prevent policy
from adding to instability while preservingfinite variance in the instrument.1
This paper grew out of consideration of thefollowing question: In a situation
of instrument instability, is there a well-definedbest policy subject to the constraint
that the instrument did not explode?The answer is yes. It is also found thatif
we put bounds on thelevel or the variance of the instrument, theoptimal con-
strained policy does not converge to theoptimal unconstrained policy as the
bounds are relaxed. In the situationconsidered by Cagan and Schwartz, therefore,
we can find the proportionof the forecastable variance in GNPwhich can be
eliminated by use of a monetary aggregate aspolicy variable without inducing
explosive oscillations in money. If it were toturn out that this proportionis
close to unity, the Cagari and Schwartzobjection to discretionary monetarypolic
would lose most of its force, whereasif this proportion were close to zero,their
objection would be confirmed.
Economists working with larger modelsthan the monetarist single equation
are apt to scoff at the veryidea of instrument instability. Inthe abstract, instrument
instability is either no problem atall o a specification error in theobjective
funcion. If you are worried about anexplosive time path for an instrument,the
Cagan anti Schwartz regad this point asfurther support for Friedman's (1959 c.g.( arguments
against discretionary monetary policy.
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sue of that instrumentought to appear in the objective function, If YOUare no
worried about the size of the inst ruinent as a target.then there can be rioohjectjì
to explosive time paths.
There are probably no variables in most economic models which are 'pure
instrumentsin the sense that they ought not to enter the objective function at all
But there certainly are variables, like moneysupply or relative pricevariables
which should enter the objective function with weights so small that historically
observed patterns of variation in them have negligible cflcts on the value of the
objective function. If somewhat larger than usual oscillations in the money supply
would reduce unemployment and inflation simultaneously, CVCfl by fairly small
amounts, few economists would worry aboutthe welfare effects of the oscillations
in money. But if a policy optimization in an econometric model Suggested oscil-
lations in the money supply by a factor of tOO from quarter to quarter over a four-
year horizon, most economistswould he skeptical of the solution, for tworeasons
First, oscillations that large achieved by' the usual policy measures mi2ht impair
the functioning of the banking system and securities markets, causing a real
welfare loss, even if the model were correct. Second. small errors in specification
in the model, or small random f1uctuatiois in the model's policy multipliers
would be magnified by such large movements in a policy variable. Putting the
same thing another way. the specification errorin the model when it is extended
to historically unprecedented policy inputs may in fact be large.
We could say then that the instrument instability problem, when it appears.
should be resolved by making variation in the instrument part of the objective
function, albeit with small weight. Unfortunately in actual economic control
problems use of a finite tinie horizon becomes a computational necessity. Unless
the time horizon is at a point so far in the future that we in fact are indifferent to
what happens after that point, use of a realistically small weight on variation in
the instrument in the objective function in a situation of instrument instability
can be shown to produce very bad policy solutions. One possibility is to use an
infinitehorizori solution with small realistic weight on instrument variation in
the objective function. But if a fairly short horizon is a computational necessity.
a good approximate solution can be found by optimizing subject to the constraint
that the policy path be stable.
In what follows the best stable policy is explicitly derived for a simple bivariate
linear model with quadratic objective function. We show also that this policy is
arbitrarily close to any policy with long enough time horizon relative to a small
enough weight on instrument variation in the objective function. In the final
section are some suggestions as to how instrument instability can be recognized
and its bad effects avoided in practical attempts to find optimal policies in econo-
metric models.
I. INSTRUMENT INSTABILITYiN .ASMP11MoolT
Suppose we have a structural equation
(I) = a * .x'(t) + uU).
25twhere"*"is the convolution operator and is defined by
a *(f) = -_sj
We will assume throughout thata(t) =0 fort<0. The variablevis the endogenous
or output variable, .vis the control variable, anduis the exogenous input or
disturbance variable. Suppose the objective at each point in time is tominimize
y(t)2. and that over time our objective function is
(2) Q =:Ry(s)2.
where R is the discount rate. If theufunction is known andx(s)for .s is
known, then optimal policy need consider onlyu(t)and x(s) fors < Iin the choice
of.x(z), setting x(t)= (l/a(0))( -- u(t)LI a(s)x(t - .$)).This rule achieves r(t)=0
over the full time horizonI =1.....T.
Now if this rule has been followed for all past t andwill be followed indefinitely
into the future, the functionsuand x are related by a*. = - u.If in addition
< ,a will generally have an inverse underconvolution2 which is
C itself a square-summable function on the integers.The functionamay or may
not satisfy the condition a'(s)=0 fors <0. In those cases where a' does
satisfy this "one-sidedness" condition, we canwrite x= a'*uto display the
S.
way current and pastvalues ofudetermine .x(t). But where a' is not one-sided,
the assumption that the optimalrule has been followed for all time still implies
31
x=a*u.We know that the optimal rule makesxa function of past values of
itself and of current and past values ofu.In fact, it is easy to see that we can always ss
expressx(t)as a function of u(s) for - M< s and x(s) for s M. If the .0
in
influence ofx(s)forS-M on(t)dwindles to zero as M goes to infinity, xO)
can be written as afunction of current and past values ofu(t)alone. But where ty
a' is two-sided we know this is notpossible, so in this case the influence of the Ill
in distant past of .x does not dwindle away astime goes on. Initial conditions have
an undamped, andpossibly explosive, effect. This is instrumentinstability.
nt
2. THE BEST STABE.E SOLUTION te
To make your candles last fbr a', is
You wh'esand maids gire ear-o! all
To put 'em out's the onlyway, a1
Says honest JohnBoldero.3 ;cd
Whittle (1963) takes what islabeled instrument instabilityin the foregoing tO-
section to be the standardsituation in his treatmentof linear regulation. In his
treatment,u(t)is a stationary stochastic process,and the problem isformulated
as choice of the bestlinear relation betweenx(t) and those values of u(s)observable
2 The exception, which may arise when a's Fouriertransform has a zero for a real argument, is
unimportant in that for such an a we canstill choose a squaresummabtebfor each e > 0 to guarantee
thatb *a(0)=I and,, ,,b * a(s)2< i.
Nursery rhyme.
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at time t. Bestness.in this stationarYstochastic framework, is dctined as
tion of the variancCof
)4
iormulated in this way.the problem has a weli-dehned SOlution ordinarily.
even if the varianceof x(l) is not added tothe objective function. ly themethod
described in Whittle. onecreates a Hubert spaceII, from 11(f),
tinder the covarianceinner product. If constraints oninformation availableto the
policy maker can heexpressed as limiting x(t) to a clOSC(l suhspace H, of H
a * x(t) islimited to the suhspace* llfound by mapping each element
IL into a * z. Thesolution is then to set a* x(i) eq ual to the projectioji of u(t)on
a * H,. When ais one-sidedand ii, is given the natural form making it the
subspace spanned by u(t+ .$)..sh, then a = 11uIn this Ct5C the form of
a puts nolimits on the choiceof a * x. and all forecastable varjtnce in uU) is
eliminated. Where a has noone-sided inverse, on the other hand, not all fore.
castable variance in u(i ) iseliminated. but a determinate solution is found. Except
when the Fourier transformof a has zeros for real arguments. the solution yields
an x(t) withfinite variance.
We know from SectionIthat starting from any initial condition all fore-
castable variance in u can heexactly eliminated. When there is no loss of welfare
from explosive time pathsfor v. one clearly does better eliminating all forecastabk
variance in ii than byusing the stationary solution for x. If the objective function
puts weight on variancein. theobjective function for the Statioflary problem
becomes
QE{y(t)2 + bx(i)2]
while for the problem of Section 1it becomes
Q = V (c(s)2+
:=
When b is positive and R = I, the solution tothe problem of Section 1 with fore-
casts ofunohsered u's treated asccrtainty-equivaletltS converges to the stationary
solution as T goes to infinity. Therefore. as b goes to zero,the infinite-horizon
solution converges to the stationary solution, even thoughwhen h is exactly zero.
the certainI'-equivalent solution does not converge to thestationary solution as
1 goes to infinity.
Before discussing the implications of these results. wewill derive them
precisely in a model with specific choice of a.
3. ANExnJ(iI Sot r:i ION
Peter U hiu'ivil!,u' 'ergo
UHihiV( Uknow the rt'(is(iHitr
IL' (0//OWN his ,io.se ithe,'e'er he goes.
.ini! that .sta,id.s all awr.
\Vhiitic does (real non-stationar andn.hasiic inputs. hut his approach totwo-sided a
is faith rcprt.nted h this simpler model
Nurerv rh nic
26uLet us takea(f)= 0 forI> I, (1(0)c, and at I) = I. Let us suppose further
thatu(t)is a covariance-stationary stochastic process. Making the naturalassump
tion on information (low thatx{I)k choseit with knowledge of 4) for .s < t, an
explicit solution is possible for least-squares predicted future values of it at each
point in time. We will designate by fi1(t) the lime path expected for u based on
information available at lime I (when x(l) is chosen).
Consider the problem of minimizing E(Q), where Q is defined in (4) above
and the expectation is conditioned on u(s), s<1. This is well known to be equiva-
lent to solving the deterministic minimization problemobtained by replacing u
by i1 in Q. The first-order conditions for this problemyield the difference equation
with the end-point condition
(h + c)x(T) + x(T -1) =(T)
and an initial condition determined by the knownvalue of x(0). Equatioti (5)'s
characteristic equation has two roots which, whenexpanded to terms of first
order inb,are given by,
G1 = (lIc)[l + (h/(R
.2))] G2=(c/R)[l -(b/(R - c2))]
(for R > effects of b on roots somewhat differentfor R <.c2).
The general solution to (5) can bewritten as
x(t) = *(i) + K1G + K2G.
where(I)is defined indefinitely into the future by theleast-squares forecasting
rule and into the past by setting itequal to u's known past values. The constants
K1 and K2 are determined by theinitial and endpoint conditions.
If b0, (6) and the initial condition willforce the K applying to the unstable
root to zero as T goes toinfinity. If b is zero and c is less than one,the unstable
root (- 1/c) will not beeliminated as Tgoes to infinity. In fact,it is easily shown
that when (T) = 0,
K1=k1A,K2 =k2A,
where A = x(0l + a*(0) and k! and k2 dependonly on T, b, c, and R. As T
goesto infinity with b, c,and R fixed, k1 goes to zeroand k2 to one. The sum k1 ± k2
is identically one. Solvingfor x(l). we find
x(l) = -a*i(l) -1- (G1k1 + G2k2)A.
Imagine now that we findeach value of x(t) by solvingthe foregoing problem
over the horizon I + I.....z+ T. This willproduce
(II) x(O(Gtki + G2k2)x(t1) = -a' *(() +(G1k1 + G,k2)a'*u,(I -I).
The right-hand side of(ll) is astationary stochastic processwith finite variance.
Theseare of course alsoconditional expectations if u(t) isGaussian.Thus it is easily seen from the left-hand sid' of( IIthat x(t) iSI Sldtiollaryl)roces
if the absolute value of G1k1G,k, is less than one.
If we aHow 7' to go to infinity and theii let R go iO One and h tozero, (II)
becomes
(12) v(t) = cx(t - 1) ci,(t) (Ic2)(et(: ++
It is a mildly tedious but straightforward matter to verify that (12) iexactly the
solution to the stationary problem obtained fromWhittle's approach.
Some remarks about these results are now in order. Themoving-hori0
solution (11) with non-zero h may lead to a (disastrous) unstable policyif b is
small and Tnot large enough. This despite the fact that as time goes on thevariation
in x comes to dominate the loss function the short horizon makes itseem always
worthwhile to worsen the instability in x, no matter how bad theSituation has
already become. With very small h the T necessary to guarantee stabilityfor .v
may he very large, and the size of this 7' has nothing to do with the intervalover
which u(1) is showing interesting behavior. 'Thus choosing T just longerthan the
forecasting "horizon" may lead us awry.
Note that the performance of the stable policy (12) relative to theunstable
optimal policy depends crucially on how u(1) behaves. If ti,(t)= ii(t + s) over a
range of s fairly far into the future, then it is easily' verified from (12) thatwe wilt
have approximately a * x = where the right-hand side is interpretedas the
stochastic process of one-step-ahead forecasts of u(ii. In this case, then, theeffect
of the control on y is little affected by the restriction to stable solutions.The
assumed behavior for ii,(s) appears, e.g., if u(t) is a smooth process plusa white
noise. On the other hand in this example, with c positive and less than one, strong
negative serial correlation in u could make the stable policy havemuch less
effect on v than the unstable policy
To obtain (12) from the moving-horizon solutionswe had to set R = I. So
long as Rc, a discounted objective function does not lead to unstablex; bui
the stable, infinite-horizon solution with R < 1 is not the best stationarysolution.
Finite-horizon solutions with Tgreat enoughto guarantee stability but not large
enough to bring the solution all the way to the form of(12) providean analogy.
In both cases, the average value ofover time is higher than the best achievable
value, but remains bounded. When R1, some current reduction in v variance is
always being purchased at theexpense of a larger deferred cost in .v variation.
Thus it is not obvious that the stationary solution ought alwaysto be applied.
It may be useful to providea benchmark against which to measure the expected
losses from other stable policies, but thebenefits from moving toward the best
stationary solution may not exceed the short-runcosts in the presence of discount-
ing.
The case where c is close toone requires special consideration. When c is
exactly one, a - ' does notexist. The best stationary policy still exists, but itis
identical with the best unstable policy.and both involve an .(i) with infinite
variance. The explosiveness in optimalx in this case is linearxt) is a process
with uncorrelated incrementsinstead of exponential as when e is less than one.
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This case is more diffIcull to deal with than either the stable case or the exponen-
tially explosive case, because we can no longer hope that the solution will be
insensitive to the choice of b for small h and large T In the stable or exponentially
explosive cases, the fact that we know that h should be small is enough to determine
a good policy: in the c = 1 case,there is no way of avoiding the need for a precise
choice of h and a very long time horizon in arriving at the best policy.
Though cases with c exactly one are not likely in practice, cases with c close
to one, whether above or below, are quite likely. Though with c above one the
optinial policy with b = 0 is stable and with c below one it is not stable, in both
cases the solution will be sensitive to b until h gets extremely small, so that the
= 0 solution maylose its practical relevance.
4. IMPLICATIONS FOR PRAC1iCt
I think most of the remarks at the end of the previous section are important
considerations in controlling actual econometric models. Time horizonsused in
controlling such models have not been so long that we can reasonably claim to be
indifferent to what happens beyond T, and in the one example I knowof where the
effect on policy of changes in objective-function weights on instrumentvariation
has been examined [Holbrook (1973)], theeffect is large. This suggests, without
proving, that instrument instability may be a problem. so thatfinite-horizon
solutions are leading us down an unstable path.
Though finding a stationary stochastic optimal policyfor a large econometric
model is not impossible, the Monte Carlo techniquesrequired in the case of
nonlinear models would probably be prohibitivelyexpensive. Expense probably
also rules out any attempt to work withextremely long time horizons.
There is, however, what seems to me a practical way toavoid serious error,
via appropriate terminal conditions on policy.The instability in the system which
is stored up in the terminal period state vectoris. in economic terminology, a
stock with negative value. To guaranteereasonable results from a finite-horizon
optimization, the terminal value of that stock musteither be constrained or
entered into the objective function. Anatural way to evaluate the stock is to
return all policy variables to zero(or their trend values) and let the system run
until it damps, then add up the losses.In practice then, the value of thisstock
could be entered into the objectivefunction by optimizing in the usual way subject
to the constraint that policyvariables be set at zero over the last 1<periods. These
last k periods would ordinarily bechosen to come after forecastablevariation in
disturbances has died away: so theywould represent a net increase in thetime
horizon: but because the additionalperiods have no free policy choicesattached,
they do not add to the dimensionalityof the optimization problem.
The foregoing suggestion wouldcertainly prevent unstable solutions.Where
system dynamics are slowlydamped, a solution with suchterminal conditions
might, for small Tand k, fail to he a verygood solution: the finite-horizonsolution
without such terminal conditionscould well be better. But theusefulness of such
terminal conditions can be tested byvarying 7 with k held fixed.If the variation
They would arise. e.g.. in thediscrete-time equivalent of an exponentiallag distribution with
locally smooth x(t). See Sims(l97l1.
263in T leaves the first-period decision nearly unchanged, the terminal conditI05
are functioning correctly. Asimilar insensitivity to '1 for the soltjo
without the
terminal conditions does not confirm the appropriateness of that solutionIt is
easy to verify in the simpleexample of the preceding section thateVCfl with 60,
terminal conditions like those suggested here bring US CIOSC to the best
stable
solution with short time horizon when e' is not tot) close to onc.
5. Tuu MONFY/1N' SW
The estimated lag distribution relating GNP to current and past VIjUSof
the monetary base (MB) from my 1972 .1,n&'ricwj LconOI?li(' article is, for
= 0 ,0.603,0.593.0.509. 0.029, ---0.011, ft65, 0.037.0.296,0.0729
The Z-translorm of this lag distribution has a pair of roots with absolute
value
0.813 and angular coordinate corresponding to a frequency of 10.21quarters
With this small an absolute value. the naive variance-minimizing policywould
make MB explode very rapidly (at a rate of 23 percent per quarter).
Now suppose that the residual u(r) in the explanation of (NP bycurrent
and lagged MB has an autoregressive representation of the form tilt)= I.Suft - 1)
0.5625i4r - 2) -ftill, where e(1) is white noise. (This form of serial correlation
for the residuals was assumed in the AER article, ant] tests found no conclusive
evidence against it.) Then using information on past values of GNP and MBalone,
and assuming the estimated lag distribution is the true one, the unstable optimal
policy would use MB to exactly eliminate the effects of lagged u's,so that for
observed values of GNP we would have GNP(t) = c(S). Computation shows that
the residual standard error in GNP(t) after the optimal stable policy had been
applied would be 1.2 times as large as the standard error ofe(t). This isa noticeable,
but not overwhelming, loss iii ability to control. The loss appears even smaller
when one realizes that the results of the exogeneity test in the AER paper imply
that iume of the potential for controlling GN P by variations in M B has been used
in the postwar period, with MB variance having had a purely destabilizing effect.
The assumed serial correlation pattern for 'iU) implies that the reduction in
standard error of GNP available from optimal control without stability restrictions
is 77 percent, whereas with the stability restriction the reduction available is 72
percent.' ° lithe lag distribution were known exactly, there would be little ground
for arguing that instrument instability renders policy powerless in this instance.
Of course the lag distrinition is not known exactly. The problem of instru-
ment instability, as an analytical phenomenon, can only get worse in the presence
of persistent uncertainty about the true shape of the lag distribution. Using the
standard distribution theory for least-squares regression estimates, the probability
u For example, with T= 6. c = 0.7. the terminal condition st TI = 0 yields the best stationai)
solution almost exactly. though with c = 09. T= 6 is no' large enough. With c = 09. T = 18 Will
provide as much accuracy as T6 with e = 0.7.
The (JNP on Mi lag distribution from my article used by ('agan and Schwartz is, despite my
assertions to the contrars in the tct of the article, fairly strongly biased by seasonal factors. This bias
does not affect the conclusions of the article corn-c rning thecxoge neity teSt. hut it does make the
estimated shape of the distribution quite unreliable.
These reductions are in comparison with,a pohicof exponential growth of moneY supply at
its historical trend rate.
204distribution of the size of the roots of the Z-transform of an estimated lag distri-
bution is intractable, as far as I know. Furthermore, small errors of specification
may, for a long lagdistribution, liaceiy large effects on the accuracy of the
estimated roots of the Z-transform.
The foregoing remarks raise some open questions. instrument instability
and uncertainty may yet be shown to interact in a waymakinggood policy extreme-
ly conservative. Instrumentinstability in itself, however, even in the spectacularly
explosive forms found by Cagan and Schwartz, is not necessarily a major barrier
to success for an activepolicy.
Unit'ersiiy ofMinnesota
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